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American pragmatism has always been less a coherent
philosophical school or movement than a family--often a
contentious family--of philosophers holding distinct if
related positions on the nature of knowledge, meaning, and
truth. Almost from the moment William James first used the
term to refer to a philosophical creed, it was repudiated or
qualified by those whom James soughtto embrace warmly as
fellow pragmatists. Charles S. Peirce, the friend to whom
James granted an honored place as father of the pragmatic
method, quickly denied paternity of the child James had
adopted and announced he would henceforth refer to his own
doctrine as "pragmaticism," a word "ugly enough to be safe
from kidnappers." John Dewey, though deeply indebted to
James's thinking, nonetheless took care to distinguish his
own "instrumentalism" from what he took to be James's more
tender-minded efforts to use pragmatism to protect religious
belief. Peirce, in turn, responded to Dewey's praise of his
essay on "What pragmatism ls" (1905) with a puzzled letter
noting that Dewey's instrumental logic "forbids all such
researches as those which I have been absorbed in for the
last eighteen years." And when one extends the term "prag-
matism" to include the metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic,
religious, and political arguments that Peirce, James, and
Dewey attached more or less loosely to their epistemological
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positions, the differences between these three philosophers
become even more apparent. 1
If anything, contemporary "neo-pragmatism" is even more
diverse than that which arose at the turn of the century.
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Today we are confronted with an often bewildering array of
efforts by philosophers, political theorists, legal scholars,
and literary critics to reappropriate, recast, and recon-
struct praqmatism. Part of the explanation for this diver-
sity may lie in broad way in which contemporary pragmatism
has come to be defined. As Giles Gunn has said, "contem-
porary pragmatic theory has long since given up James's
somewhat restricted focus on the nature of knowledge and the
meaning of truth and has turned its attention more broadly to
issues that are essentially moral and political." The
difficulty that this turn presents for any effort to pin down
neo-pragmatism is that pragmatism, narrowly conceived as a
set of arguments about knowledge, meaning, and truth, has no
determinate moral and political implications. As James said,
it "stands for no particular results. It has no dogmas, and
no doctrines save its methode ••. Innumerable chambers
1Charles S. Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders
Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1935), 5.414-437; 8.243-44; John
Dewey, "What Praqmatism Means by Practical" (1908), ~
Middle Works of John Dewey (Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1977), 4:98~115. See also Garry Brodsky,
"The pragmatic Movement," Review of Metaphysics 25 (1971/72):
262-291.
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open out of it." What most neo-pragmatists have done is
adopt pragmatism as their "anti-foundationalist" epis-
3
temologieal theory of ehoiee and thencouple it with a
variety of moral and politieal eommitments whieh owe more or
less of a debt to Peiree, James, and Dewey. Thus in trying
to sort out the neo-pragmatists and diseern their relation-
ship to the old pragmatists, we should, perhaps, diseriminate
between the reappropriation of pragmatism and the reap-
propriation of the thinking of those philosophers who were,
among other things, pragmatists. I should like to say a bit
today about the former, yet eoneentrate my remarks on one
aspeet of the latter. 2
2Giles Gunn, Thinking Aeross the Ameriean Grain: Ideolo-
gy, Intellect, and the New Pragmatism (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992), p.4; William James, Pragmatism (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 32. The politi-
cal heterogeneity of neo-pragmatism is perhaps most evident
in legal theory, in which the new pragmatists range from
radieal feminists to market-loving adherents of the law and
economics school. See the "SYmposium on the Renaissance of
Pragmatism in Ameriean Law," Southern California Law Review
63 (1990): espe 1587-1670, 1699-1746, 1763-1782; and Richard
A. Posner, Tbe Problems of Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1990), pp. 454-469. Peiree may have put
his finger on another source of confusion. "At present," he
complained in 1905, "[pragmatism] begins to be met with
oecasionally in the literary journals, where it gets abused
in the merciless way that words have to expect when they fall
into literary clutches" (Collected Papers, 5.414).
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As far as the reappropriation of ~agmatism as a theory
of knowledge, meaning, and truth is concerned, perhaps the
most noteworthy divide among new pragmatists is that between
philosophers and other theorists who have turned to prag-
matism in order to work their way out of the skeptical
implications and moral relativism of much postmodernist
thinking and philosophers and other theorists who have
embraced pragmatism because they see it as a homespun,
American version of such skepticism. This divide is, for
exampIe, one way one might plausibly describe the differences
separating the two major neo-pragmatist philosophers, Hilary
Putnam and Richard Rorty.
The Putnam-Rorty face off reminds a good deal of the
disagreements between Peirce and James. Although Putnam is a
sharp critic of the correspondence theory of truth and what
he calls "metaphysical realism" and he loads his pragmatism
(which he terms "internal realism" or "realism with a human
face") with historicist and contextualist arguments, he does
subscribe to three principles which he says--correctly I
believe--Rorty would not accept:
1. In ordinary circumstances, there is usually a
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fact of the matter as to whether the statements
people make are warranted or not.
2. Whether a statement is warranted or not is
independent of whether the majority of one's
cultural peers would §gy it is warranted or
unwarranted.
5. Our norms and standards of anythinq--including
warranted assertibility--are capable of reform.
There are better and worse norms and standards. 3
Rorty, Putnam says, cannot speak, as he does, of ideas which
"pay their way" without specifying what this means--without,
that is, positing some way of distinguishing between war-
5
ranted ("profitable") and unwarranted ("unprofitable") ideas.
And, taking a Peircean turn, Putnam argues that--even if we
link truth to the practices of communities of inquiry--we
cannot make do without a notion of truth that stands apart
from the momentary consensus of any particular community.
Putnam contends that "to claim of any statement that it is
true, that is, that it is true in its place, in its context,
3Hilary Putnam, Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 21. The other two
principles--which Rorty would no doubt accept--are: "3. Our
norms and standards of warranted assertibility are historical
products; they evolve in time. 4. Our norms and standards
always reflect our interests and values. Our picture of
intellectual flourishing is part of, and only makes sense as
part of, our picture of human flourishinq in general."
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in its conceptual scheme is, roughly, to claim that it could
be iustified were epistemic conditions good enough." Rorty,
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who thinks Peirce suffered from too many Kantian hangovers to
earn title to genuine pragmatism, denies that we need any
gold standard such as "ideal epistemic conditions" by which
to measure the worth of ~ur ideas. Without such a standard,
Putnam responds, Rorty falls prey to relativism and solip-
sism, albeit solipsism of a communitarian sort ("solipsism
with a 'we' instead of an 'I'"). If, as Rorty said some
years ago, the old pragmatists "are waitinq at the end of the
road which Foucault and Deleuze are currently traveling,"
they are, Putnam would say, waitinq there to warn us that we
are about to qo over a cliff and to urqe us to turn back and
follow their neqlected path alonq the edqe of the abyss.4
Without really arguinq the point, let me say that my own
sYmpathies are with Putnam and others who are wary of the
alliances that Rorty, and others have tried to forqe between
pragmatism and contemporary literary theory and other strains
4 ~e~iism .Putnam, . wJ.th a Human Face, pp. vii-ix, 105-119;
Richard Rorty, 'Conseguences of Praamatism (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1982), xviii, 161. See also
Hilary Putnam, Reason. Truth. and History (Cambridqe:
Cambridge University Press, 1981), esp. eh. 5; and Jeffrey
stout, Ethics After Babel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988).
Putnam distinguishes his standard from Peirce's "utopian"
epistemic ideal of "a situation ('finished science') in which
the community would be in a position to justify every true
statement (and to disconfirm every false one)." He means
only to say that "there are better and worse epistemic
situations with respect to particular statements" (Reason
with a Human Face, vii-viii).
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of postmodernism. As a matter of inteIIectual history, it
seems to me that the thinking of the former is more con-
tinuous with that of the old pragmatists than that of the
latter, and as a matter of epistemology and ethics, it seems
to me that they afford us a more promising prospect. Gunn
may be correct as far as intellectual fashions go when he
says that American pragmatism "would never have been capable
of revival if it had not seemed to complement (and in some
ways to confirm) rather than contest that body of critical
and theoretical thought already transmitted from the Con-
tinent." But be that as it may, we should not necessarily
applaud, as he does, the conjoining of the James and Dewey
with the likes of Jacques Derrida, stanley Fish, Jürgen
Habermas, Frank Lentricchia, and Barbara Herrnstein Smith.
My own view is that if James and Dewey were invited to this
party they would throw Habermas in the back seat and go
looking for a more congenial gathering. S
What joins Habermas to the old pragmatists (leaving
aside what divides him from them), is a shared unwillingness
to abandon entirely the Enliqhtenment legacy or, to put it
more positively, a willingness to stick with science while at
the same time calling into question any claims that science
(or any other mode of inquiry) might make to certain truth.
As Habermas says, postmodernist thinkers "believe that they
SGunn, Tbinking Across the American Grain, p. 3.
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have to tear philosophy away from the madness of expounding a
theory that has the last word" and forget that" "the fal-
libilist consciousness of the sciences caught up with
phi1osophy, too, a long time ago." One pIace where it caught
up first was in the United states, for as Putnam has noted,
"you only get the flavor of [pragmatism] is you try to wrap
your mind around the idea of being fallibilistic and anti-
skeptical at the same time.,,6
Postmodernists turn to the old praqmatists because they
(correctly) see them as potential partners in a tag-team wrestling
. - .
,.match against "strong," that is absolutist and totalizing,
conceptions of truth. But what they neglect is the old
pragmatists' conviction that once they were confident they
had kicked some absolutist butt they could step out of the
ring and travel down the road of inquiry in a more fuel-
efficient vehicle than Reason toward a more modest destina-
tion than Truth. That is, they saw no need to abandon reason
and truth or, as Dewey put it to avoid confusion, "intel-
ligence" and "warranted assertibility." As Richard Bernstein
observes, the old pragmatists "were not obsessed with
attacking over and over again the absolutism and foun-
6Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of
Modernity (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), p. 408n28; Hilary
Putnam, "Afterword," Southern California Law Review 63
(1990): 1914. On the relationship between Habermas and
pragmatism see the special issue of Symbolic Interaction 15
(Fall 1992), especially Eugene Halton, "Habermas and Rorty:
Between Scylla and Charybdis," 333-358.
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dationalism that they rejected. The primary problem was how
to reconstruct philosophy in a manner that was compatible
with a fallibilistic orientation and a appreciation of the
radical plurality of experience. ••• The creative task is
to learn to live~ an irreducible continqency and am-
biquity--not to iqnore it and not to wallow in it. . . .
Althouqh we mayabandon any claim to infallible rationality,
we cannot qive up on the demand for makinq reasonable
discriminations. This is just what the praqmatists souqht to
do." 7
II
Let me now happily leave behind what Dewey called the
"epistemoloqy industry." If we turn to the broader dimen-
sions of the thinkinq of the old praqmatists, it will come as
no surprise for me to say that I believe Dewey's democratic
theory is one of the richest veins that neo-pragmatists
should mine, and hence I think one of ,the most siqnificant
disagreements among contemporary praqmatists is that between
Rorty and his critics about what a nneo-Deweyan" ethics and
politics miqht mean, criticism spawned by Rorty's loyalty to
7Richard J. Bernstein, "The Resurqence of Praqmatism,"
Soclal Research (forthcominq).
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what he teasingly calls "postmodernist bourgeois liberal-
ism. ,,8
10
One of the leaders among Rorty's critics is Cornel West,
and I should like to focus on the competing "Deweyan" visions
of these two philosophers. West's quarreI with Rorty is very
much a family affair: he was once Rorty's student and the
disputes between these two philosophers are friendly con-
tests, suffused with mutual respect and obvious affection.
Indeed, one looking for a good example of the sort of
"conversation" that Rorty idealizes would be hard pressed to
find a better one than the dialogue he and West have con-
ducted. Nonetheless, the differences between Rorty and West
are substantial and of considerable moment, for, unlike many
such controversies nowadays, this one is more than academic.
At stake, is nothing less than the "social hope" we Ameri-
cans, and we American intellectuals in particular, might
reasonably nourish. 9
West's work has from the early 1980s been marked by an
effort to integrate American pragmatism with the variety of
other traditions shaping his thinking, especially evangelical
8Richard Rorty, "Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism"
(1983), in Rorty, Objectiyity. Relativism. and Truth:
Philosophical Papers Volume I (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1991), pp. 197-202.
9Richard Rorty, "Method, Social Science, and Social
Hope," in Rorty, Conseguences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1982), pp. 190-210.
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Christianity, African-American social thought, and Marxism.
And his disagreements with Rorty have been apparent for some
time as weIl. All this comes to a head in The American
Eyasion of Pbilosophy (1989), and it is here that West most
clearly stakes out his claim to offer areappropriation of
the pragmatic tradition, and of Dewey's philosophy in
particular, more satisfying than that of Rorty and other
rivals. "Rorty's neo-pragmatism," he complains, "only kicks
the philosophical props from under liberal bourgeois capital-
ist societies; it requires no change in our cultural and
political practices." Rorty kicks out these props in order
to demonstrate that our conviction that they provide essen-
tial support for the "liberal bourgeois" society he favors is
an unnecessary illusion. West wants a pragmatism that will
not only kick out these props but recommend some major
structural renovations in that same society. He calls for "a
reconception of philosophy as a form of cultural criticism
that attempts to transform linguistic, soeial, eultural, and
politieal traditions for the purposes of inereasing the seope
of individual development and demoeratie operations. n10
10Cornel West, The Ameriean Evasion of Pbilosophy: A
Genealogy of Praqmatism (Madison: University of Wiseonsin,
1989), pp. 206, 230. Subsequent eitations of this book will
be made parenthetieally in the text. West outlines his
intellectual autobiography in Prophesy Deliveranee!: An Afro-
Ameriean Reyolutionary Christianity (Philadelphia: Westmin-
ster Press, 1982), pp. 13-24 and The Ethical Dimensions of
Marxist Thought (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1991), xi-
xxxiv. His criticisms of Rorty are anticipated in "The
Pragmatism Old and New 12
West's reappropriation of praqmatism takes the form of
the sort of "dramatic narrative" of the history of philosophy
which praqmatists--Oewey and Rorty in particular--have often
deployed effectively. Such narratives comprise a Whiggish
variety of history which Rorty, following Hegel, has termed
Geistesgescbichte. This is history, he observes, that "wants
to justify the historian and his friends in having the sort
of philosophical concerns they have--in taking philosophy to
be what they take it to be. It wants to give plausi-
bility to a certain image of philosophy." At the heart of
this history i8 an effort at canon reformation. The Geist-
eshistoriker assembles a pantheon of heroes who serve as the
main characters in a drama that "shows how we have come to
ask the questions we now think inescapable and profound,.
Where these characters left writings behind, those writings
then form a canon, a reading-list which one must have gone
through in order to justify being what one is." We require
such heroes and such canons, Rorty concludes, because "we
need to tell ourselves detailed stories about the mighty dead
in order to make our hopes of surpassing them concrete."11
Politics of American Neo-Praqmatism" in John Rajchman and
Cornel west, eds., Post-Analytic Philosophy (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1985), 259-275.
llRichard Rorty, "The Historiography of Philosophy: Four
Genres," in Richard Rorty, J.B. schneewind, and Quentin
Skinner, eds., Philosophy in History (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1984), pp. 57, 61, 73. Rorty usefully
contrasts Geistesgeschichte with the equally Whiggish
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The common claim of every neo-praqmatist Geisteshis-
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toriker is that one or more of the major American pragmatists
must be rescued from the limbo in which they have resided for
two generations and assume a prominent place in the current
canon. Thus, one might weIl date the origins of neo-prag-
matic narratives to Rorty's surprising assertion at the
beginning of Philosophy and the Kirror of Nature (1979) that
Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey were "the three most
important philosophers of our century." Lately another
common feature of these stories has become established as
weIl, for several neo-pragmatists (though not Rorty) have
joined in arguing that their tale must begin with Ralph Waldo
Emerson. West advances one of the most vigorous and compel-
ling vers ions of this argument. 12
"historical reconstructions" performed by many analytical
phi1osophers which seek to justify the philosopherjhistorian
and his friends in "giving the particular solutions to
philosophical problems they give" and to lend "plausibility
to a particular solution of a given philosophical problem by
pointing out how a great dead philosopher anticipated, or
interestingly failed to anticipate, this solution" (57).
12Richard Rorty, Pbilosophy and the Mirror of Nature
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 5. Besides
West, others arguing for the central p1ace of Emerson in the
praqmatic tradition include Russell B. Goodman, American
Philosophy and the Romantic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990); David Harr, American Worlds Since
Emerson (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988);
and Richard Poirer, The Renewal of Literature: Emersonian
Reflections (New York: Random House, 1987) and Poetry and
Praqmatism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992). This
new interest in Emerson and his legacy owes much to the work
of Stanley Cavell. See especia11y Conditions Handsome and
Unhandsqme: The Constitution cf Emersonian Perfectionism
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In Emerson, West argues, we find the origins of two
14
valuable strains of thought as weIl as a debilitating
limitation that subsequently shaped the thinking of most of
the great and near-great among American philosophers. First,
Emerson initiated the healthy "evasion" of the "epistemology-
centered problematic of modern philosophy" with its quest for
incorrigible foundations for knowledge in favor of a view of
knowledge "not as a set of representations to be justified,
grounded, or privileged but rather as instrumental effacts of
human will as it is guided by human interests, which are in
turn produced by transactions with other humans and nature"
(36). Second, Emerson launched a "theodicy" of "power,
provocation, and personality" which stressed the "dynamic
character of selves and structures, the malleability of
tradition and the transformative potential in human history"
(10).13 Third (and less happily), West finds in Emerson an
irrepressibly bourgeois individualism and elitism. Despite
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
13west is a professor of religion and I am not, but I
nevertheless am puzzled by his use of the term "theodicy,"
which as I understand it refers to the problem of explaining
evil in the face of God's omnipotence and goodness. I do not
see how one can call Emerson's views on "power, provocation,
and personality" a theodicy. They seem to me to be more of
an American version of what, to borrow a term from Isaiah
Berlin and Charles Taylor, might be called romantic "expres-
sivism," more a philosophical anthropology than a theodicy.
When I think of Emerson's theodicy, I think of his essay on
"Compensation" with its view of a long-run, cosmic balancing
of the accounts of good and evil--a view from which James and
Dewey vigorously dissented.
Pragmatism Old and New 15
the disruptive features of his philosophy and the democratic
cast of his rhetoric, Emerson's politics rested on "a refined
perspective that highlights individual conscience along with
political impotence, moral transgression devoid of fundamen-
tal soeial transformation, power without empowerinq the lower
classes, provocation and stimulation bereft of requlated
markets, and human personality disjoined from communal
action" (40).14
Emerson's salutary evasion of the quest for certainty,
his romantic vision of human agency and possibility, and his
bourgeois blindnesses echoed in the thought of Peirce, James,
and Dewey, whether or not they aeknowledged the reverbera-
140ne measure of the diversity of neo-pragmatism is the
gulf that separates West's argument about Emerson and his
legacy from that of Richard Poirer, one of the most vigorous
proponents of a postmodernist pragmatism. Poirer construes
pragmatism as "a form of linguistic skepticism" and says that
"insofar as America is represented by Emersonian pragmatists
it has always been what is called postmodernist." Linquistic
skepticism and the acts of imagination it generates, Poirer
contends, are necessarily the work of a cultural elite of
poet-philosophers who can expect to have little immediate
effect on the lives of their fellow citizens. "Pragmatism,
as I understand it," he says, is not essentially addressed
to--indeed it shies away from--historical erises, real or
concocted." Pragmatists, preoccupied as they are with "the
work with language" can have "only an indirect and minimal
effect on existing realities, and can probably have little
effect at all on the nature of work done beyond the study or
on the page" (Poetry and Praqmatism, pp. 5, 135, 132, 94).
What West sees as Emerson's shortcomings, Poirer sees as an
untroubling implication of the elite project that his "prag-
matism" required. Needless to say, Poirer's conception of
the American pragmatic tradition is not one in which Dewey
can be included, and whatever one makes of his reading of
Emerson, a genealogy of pragmatism that squeezes Dewey out is
suspect.
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tions: "Dewey plays Joshua to Emerson's Hoses, with Peiree as
a ground-breaking yet forgotten Aaron and James a brilliant
and ieonoelastie Eleazar" (76). Though West serutinizes the
work ot Peiree and James at length, his long ehapter on Dewey
is the eenterpieee of the story he teIls, and rightly so.
For as West says (pulling yet another analogy out of the same
bag) , "it Emerson is the inventor of the Ameriean religion,
Dewey is its Luther--that is, he must seriously think through
the implieations of the notions of power, provoeation, and
personality, the themes of voluntarism, optimism, individual-
ism, and meliorism in relation to the plethora of intervening
intelleetual breakthroughs and in light of the prevailing
eonditions in order to give direetion as weIl as vitality to
the Ameriean religion" (85). It is Dewey who gave the
philosophieal evasion its most powerful formulation, who
provided Emerson's romantieism with a more soeial and
demoeratie eomplexion, and who stretehed middle-elass reform
to its limits.
Heroie though Dewey's efforts to reeonstruet and extend
this tradition were, it was, West teIls us, in deep trouble
at mid-eentury: "meretrieious Stalinism, pernieious faseism,
obstinate imperialism, and myopie Amerieanism were formidable
foes that left Ameriean pragmatism with little room to
maneuver" (113). In this eontext, W.V. Quine, Wilfred
Sellars, and Nelson Goodman kept the evasion alive among
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professional philosophers: Sidney Hook, Reinhold Niebuhr, and
Lionel Trilling gave the theodicy a more realistic cast by
providing it with a tragic sensibility; and C. Wright Mills
and W.E.B. DuBois tried to supply pragmatists with a social
theory that would take better account of the constraints of
class and elite power and racial oppression. But no one was
able or willing to bring it all together and reinfuse the
mixture with Dewey's radically democratic meliorism.
Instead, post-war pragmatism gave way to "an Auqustinian
pessimism regarding the human lot coupled with a fervent
privatism and careerism in an expanding economy" (114).
There things more or less remained for pragmatism until
Rorty shook things up by giving a new paint job to the
pragmatic evasion of the foundational obsessions of modern
philosophy in the early 1980s. 15 But Rorty's neo-pragmatism
couples philosophical audacity with a social and political
15This is not to say that the pragmatists were al-
together ignored until Rorty came along. As West says, one
should not overlook "the contributions of those lonely
laborers in the vineyard who continued to keep alive the
pragmatist tradition during the age of logical positivism"
(194)--Richard Bernstein, James Gouinlock, John McDermott,
Sandra RosenthaI, John Smith, Horton White, and others--even
though they were unable to foster anything approaching the
current interest in praqmatism despite the fact (or perhaps
because of the fact) that their work--call it perhaps "paleo-
pragmatism"--represents better historical scholarship than
that of many recent converts to pragmatism. It was Rorty's
willingness to borrow very selectively from Dewey's philo-
sophy which enabled him to link praqmatism to more fashion-
able currents of thought and thereby earn Dewey a second look
among the fashionably inclined.
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conservatism, "a fervent vigilance to preserve the prevailing
bourgeois way of life" (206). So what we really need, West
concludes, is a new "prophetic pragmatism" that is epis-
temologically evasive, romantically hopeful in an Emersonian
vein yet alert to the tragic constraints on human will, open
to the lessons of Marxism and postmodernism, and dedicated to
the interests of the "wretched of the earth" (212). So like
the dramatic narratives of a typical Geisteshistoriker,
West's history ends with himself.
111
Despite his title, West is far less interested in the
American evasion of philosophy than in the fate of the
Emersonian theodicy and the "culture of creative democracy"
it promises. What animates West's story, above all, is his
contention that, until Dewey came along, the Emersonian
commitment to democracy was a limited one and his distress
that the Deweyan moment was so short-lived and practically
impotent. One can, on West's own evidence, be a pragmatist
in the narrow sense (an "evader") and not subscribe to the
Emersonian theodicy. And one can be an Emersonian romantic
(or one of its immanent critics) without giving much thought
to epistemological questions. strictly speaking, West has
two narratives at work here, which come together whenever one
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of his Emersonian romantics--James, Dewey, himself--is also a
pragmatist.
Thus, despite the impression West sometimes leaves, the
connections between the pragmatic evasion of philosophy and
Emersonian democracy are contingent, not necessary. Rorty
has made this point forcefully. pragmatism, he says, His
neutral between alternative prophecies, and thus neutral
between democrats and fascists." One should not, he says,
look to "professorial pragmatism" for prophecy, and he
ruefully accepts West's contention that his own work as a
professional philosopher is "barren" of political implica-
tion. The anti-epistemological evasion "is socially useful
only if teamed up with prophecies--fairly concrete prophecies
of a utopian social future. Praqmatist philosophy professors
like Quine, Putnam, Davidson, Bernstein, and myself can play
a social role only if they can find some prophet to whom to
attach themselves." To Rorty, the term "prophetie prag-
matism" sounds as odd as "charismatic trash-disposal.,,16
Rorty is not entirely on target here. He acknowledges
that in an earlier era there was still some relation between
praqmatic philosophical doctrines and sceial reform because
conservatives were "still trying to justify repressive
institutions in either religious or rationalist terms. So
16Richard Rorty, "The Professor and the Prophet,"
Transition 52 (1991): 75-77.
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bringing pragmatist arguments to bear against religious or
20
rationalist arguments for politieal eonservatism was a useful
thing for James and Dewey to do." I still think this kind of
dismantling of absolutisms (of the left as weIl as the right)
is something that needs to be done, and Rorty's sense that
this is no longer neeessary suggests a eertain blindness to
the eharaeter of Ameriean polities. But what ean no longer
be said is that there is any neeessary affinity between
pragmatism and liberal demoeraey, as Dewey was sometimes
inelined to argue. A pragmatie anti-foundationalism ean be
tied to some pretty nasty soeial propheeies, as the example
of Heidegger suggests. This eontingeney also explains why so
many of West's evaders prove disappointing demoerats. 17
Rorty also admits that James and Dewey managed to be
both pragmatists and prophets. But he now thinks a division
of labor should prevail, whieh West--by force of his own
example--disputes (though, to be sure, he has yet to make his
mark as a professional philosopher). However, what Rorty
wants to eontest, above all, is Dewey's eontention that
philosophers have something speeial--what he ealled general
"ground mapstt--for soeial and eultural eritieism. West
would, I believe, dispute this as weIl, although he (like
17I bid., 76. On Heidegger's pragmatism see Mark Okrent,
Heidegger's Praqmatism: Understanding. Being, and the
Critigue of Metaphysies (Ithaea: Cornell university Press,
1988).
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Dewey) wants a eultural eritieism that breaks down diseipli-
nary barriers. As long as foundationalism remains a powerful
foree in our eulture, there is something perfeetly sound
about "prophetie pragmatism." But in our own time, a
prophetie pragmatist must also be prepared to do battle with
other evaders, not at the level of "ground maps" but at the
level of propheey. Among intelleetuals--espeeially when the
struggle is among putative demoerats--there is less need for
epistemologieal preliminaries. ene ean eut to the ethieal
ehase, and, as Dewey said, ask not who has the superior
knowledge but who has the greater wisdom, that is, "a sense
for the better kind of life to be led."18
What Rorty and West are arguing about is less Dewey's
pragmatism than his propheey and his wisdom. What West and
others (ineluding myself) have shown is that Dewey trans-
formed Emersonian romantieism into avision of an inclusive
and fUll-partieipatory demoeratie eulture. This is not an
aspeet of Dewey's thought (though I would say it is at the
heart of his philosophy) whieh Rorty has sought to ap-
propriate. His own lightly sketehed politieal philosophy
owes more to John Rawls than ta Dewey. For Rorty, liberal-
18John Dewey, Experienee and Nature (1925), The Later
Works of John Dewey (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
Press, 1981), 1:309; and "Philosophy and Democracy" (1918),
The Middle Works of John Dewey (Carbondale: Southern Illinois
university Press, 1982), 11:143-144. Rorty denies any need
for even Deweyan "ground maps" in "Dewey's Metaphysics," in
Consequenees of Pragmatism, pp. 72-89.
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democratic politics involves little more than making sure
that individuals hurt one another as little as possible and
22
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interfere minimally in the private life of each. There is
little in his social or political vision of the communitarian
side of Dewey's thinking, nothing of Dewey's veneration of
the shared experience of citizens. He argues for the
centrality of solidarity in public life, but his is an
extremely thin solidarity, amounting to little more than a
common aversion to pain and humiliation and explicitly not "a
common possession or a shared power." Rorty's is a politics
centered on negative liberty, "our ability to leave people
alone."19
West's democratic vision is much closer to Dewey's own.
Though he repeats the charge of Niebuhr and Mills that Dewey
was blind to the realities of power--a charge belied by
Dewey's activism in the 1930s--and gives Dewey insufficient
credit for the alliances he forged with "working people,"
West clearly shares Dewey's hope for a more participatory
democracy. "To speak of an Emersonian culture of creative
democracy," he declares, His to speak of a society and
culture where politically adjudicated forms of knowledge are
19Richard Rorty, Continaency. Irony. and Solidarity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 91; and
"The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy" (1988), in Rorty,
Ob;ectiyity. Relatiyism. and Truth, pp. 175-196. I am
repeating here the characterization of Rorty's thinking that
I offered in John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 539-542.
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produeed in whieh human partieipation is eneouraged and for
whieh human personalities are enhaneed. Soeial experimenta-
tion is the basic norm, yet it is operative only when those
who must suffer the eonsequenees have effeetive eontrol over
the institutions that yield the eonsequenees, i.e., aeeess to
deeision-making processes" (213).
It is unfair to Rorty to pieture hirn as altogether
eomplaeent about the ills of our soeial order. He is in most
respeets a good old-fashioned New Deal liberal, and one might
even extend to him the label of soeial democrat. He eares
deeply about the plight of the wretehed of the earth, and of
late he has written movingly about the need to institute a
more adequate program of teehnoeratie soeial engineering to
eare for their needs (and of the irrelevanee of the polities
of the aeademie left to these needs). Moreover, he does not
deny that he has failed to appropriate Dewey's radieal
demoeratie vision, nor does he fail to understand how others
eould find it appealing. He just thinks it has exhausted its
relevanee for "rieh North Atlantie demoeraeies" and for
"downbeat Alexandrian" intelleetuals like himself--thouqh he
is willing to admit it might have some relevanee in such
plaees as Brazil. 20
20See Riehard Rorty, "Intelleetuals in Polities,"
Dissent (Fall 1991): 483-490; "On Intelleetuals in Polities"
(an exchange with Andrew Ross), Dissent (Spring 1992): 263-
267; and "The Intelleetuals at the End of Soeialism,"~
Review 80 (1992): 1-16; and "Unger, castoriadis, and the
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The eontrast between Rorty and West reminds me a great
deal of that between Walter Lippmann and Dewey in the 1920s.
Against Dewey's insistenee that partieipatory demoeraey must
remain the eentral regulative ideal of Ameriean life,
Lippmann eontended that it had lost its relevanee to modern
industrial soeieties and polities. Most people, he argued,
regard self-government as a seeondary, purely instrumental
good, and if they ean be assured of welfare and seeurity
without it, they will settle for a minimal and relatively
insignifieant role as eitizens. The eriterion that should be
used to assess a government, Lippmann said, was not the
extent to whieh eitizens were self-governing but "whether it
is produeing a eertain minimum of health, of deeent housing,
of material neeessities, of edueation, of freedom, of
pleasures, of beauty." without denying the need for such
things, Dewey contended that one might still hope that the
Ameriean people eould have a signifieant say as eitizens and
workers about how and in what form they were to provide them
to one another. Roberto Unger has said that "the great
politieal question of our day has beeome: Is soeial demoeraey
the best that we ean reasonably hope for?" If so, then
Rorty's answer to this question is (with Lippmann) "Yes, if
Romanee of a National Future" (1990), in Rorty, Essays on
Heidegger and Others: Philosophieal Papers: Volume 2 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge university Press, 1991), pp. 177-192.
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that," while West has responded (with Dewey and Unger) "No,
not by a longshot.,,21
IV
His book, West teIls us, "is, among other things, a
political act" (8). "prophetie pragmatism," he concludes,
"rests upon the conviction that the American evasion of
philosophy is not an evasion of serious thought and moral
action. Rather such evasion is a rich and revisable tradi-
tion that serves as the occasion for cultural criticism and
political engagement in the service of an Emersonian culture
of creative democracy" (239).
This rhetorically buoyant conclusion brings to mind an
exchange of letters John Dewey had with his friend and fellow
philosopher, Max otto, in early 1941. otto wrote to Dewey to
tell him he had been reading Dewey's 1903 essay on Emerson
with his students at the University of Wisconsin, and that he
was troubled by Dewey's "contention that Emerson is the
philosopher of democracy." No one, Otto ventured to say, who
had as little to say as Emerson did about the practice of
21Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Free Press,
1965 [1922]), pp. 196-197; Roberto M. Unger, Social Theory:
Its situation and Its Task (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987), p. 14. For a full account of the Lippmann-
Dewey debate see JohnDewey and American Democracy, pp. 293-
318.
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democracy could lay claim to that title. "Emerson's negative
attitude toward the means and organizations which are
necessary to make democratic ideals function seems to me a
serious weakness. Emerson was transported by the spirit of
reform: but from every device of reform he turned resolutely
away."22
Dewey responded that he had forgotten he had ever said
Emerson was the philosopher of democracy, and this was
certainly not something he would say in 1941. Whatever he
had said nearly forty years aga had to be put into its
context, "before the World War, before lots of things, that
have changed the meaning of things, demoeracy and philoso-
phers ineluded." Dewey still thought Emerson was "a great
representative of democratic ideas," as long as he was
properly "translated." otto was right about his neglect of
means, but unlike most eommentators, Dewey thought this
neglect could not be attributed to a naive optimism on
Emerson's part. "Instead of being over optimistie," Dewey
eoneluded, "he was, it seems to me, unduly pessimistie about
aetualities, his optimism being for (rather abstract) pos-
sibilities.,,23
22Max otto to John Dewey, 4 January 1941, Max otto
papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison.
23John Dewey to Max otto, 23 January 1941, otto Papers.
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Like Emerson, West is transported by the spirit of
demoeratie reform, yet deeidedly vague about if not, like
Emerson, resolutely averse to its deviees. And, if West
eannot be said to be unduly pessimistie about Haetualities,"
his plea for a prophetie praqmatism is marked by an almost
feverish optimism for rather abstract possibilities. Pro-
phetie praqmatism, he says, ean be Ha material force for in-
dividuality and democraey • a praetiee that has some
poteney and effeet or makes a differenee in the world" (232).
Not one to underestimate the power of the word--even when its
distribution is in the hands of a small university press--
West teIls us that, while revisiting Ameriean praqmatism with
hirn will not provide a "panaeea for our ills," it will help
us to "reinvigorate our moribund aeademie life, our lethargie
politieal life, our deeadent eultural life, and our ehaotie
personal lives for the flowering of many-sided personalities
and the flourishing of more demoeraey and freedom H (4).
Although I wish all this was true, I find myself
ineapable of working up such abstract aspirations, at least
not now. West seems to me to take too little aeeount of what
his fellow praqmatist Riehard Bernstein has deseribed as the
near-intraetable dilemma of those who would venture today
beyond Rorty's modest hope for a greater measure of soeial
demoeraey to West's immodest hope for an expansive par-
tieipatory demoeraey. As Bernstein says, "the eoming into
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being of a type of public life that can strengthen solidari-
ty, public freedom, a willingness to talk and to listen,
mutual debate, and a commitment to rational persuasion
presupposes the incipient forms of such communal life." But
what can one do in a situation such as our own "in which
there is a breakdown of such communities, and where the very
conditions of social life have the consequences of furthering
such a breakdown?" Not much, Bernstein concludes, and I find
myself sadly agreeing with him. This eclipse of democratic
publics was a difficulty that began to plague Dewey in the
1920s when he tried to deflect Lippmann's attack on self-
government, and since that time things have only gotten
worse. At best, as Bernstein says, Deweyan democrats can
only ··seize upon those experiences and struggles in which
there are still the glimmerings of solidarity and the promise
of dialogical communities in which there can be genuine
participation and where reciprocal wooing and persuasion can
prevail."24
24Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Obiectivism and Rela-
tivism: Science. Hermeneutics. and Praxis (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), pp. 226, 228. More
recently, West has himself eloquently stated Bernstein's
point. "We have," he writes in a postmortem on the Los
Angeles riots, "created a rootless, dangling people with
little link to the supportive networks--family, friends,
school--that sustain some sense of purpose in life. We have
witnessed the collapse of the spiritual communities that help
us face despair, disease and death and that transmit through
the generations dignity and decency, excellence, and ele-
gance" ("Learning to Talk of Race," New York Times Magazine
[2 August 1992]: 26).
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Perhaps West's optimism about democratic reform and
about the potential potency of his neo-pragmatism grows in
29
part out of his entrenchment as an "organic intellectual" in
the "prophetie wing of the black church," one of the few
incipient dialogical communities that continues to afford
some resistance to the constriction of democratic life. This
after all, as West says, was the community that produced
Martin Luther King, "the best of what the political dimension
of prophetie pragmatism is all about" (234). Yet even here
there is cause for concern, as West weIl knows. Few have
equaled his unsparing portrait of the afflictions of African-
American communities, afflictions against which black
Christians (and others) are bravely waging a losing battle.
Moreover, it seems to me a sign of deep trouble that again
and again we find ourselves having to reach back a generation
to the civil rights movement for a model of the sort of
democratic politics we hope to cUltivate. 25
I do not myself mean to join Rorty's club of downbeat
Alexandrians. But I do find myself responding less to West's
prophecy than to the recommendations to intellectuals offered
by C. Wright Mills in 1959 in an essay tellingly titled "The
Decline of the Left," which West quotes at length but without
comment:
25See Cornel west, "Nihilism in Black America," Dissent
(Spring 1991): 221-226.
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In summary, what we must do is to define reality of
the human condition and to make our definitions
public; to confront the new facts of history-making
in our time, and their meanings for the problem of
political responsibility; to release the human
imagination by transcending the mere exhortation of
grand principle and opportunist reaction in order
to explore all the alternatives now open to the
human community.
If this--the politics of truth--is merely a
holding action, so be it. If it is also a politics
of desperation, so be it. But in this time and in
America, it is the only realistic politics of
possible consequence that is readily open to
intellectuals. It is the quide line and the next
step. It is an affirmation of one/s self as moral
and intellectual center of responsible decision;
the act of a free man who rejects "fate"; for it
reveals his resolution to take his ~ fate, at
least, into his own hands. 26
30
26C• Wright Mills, "The Decline of the Left," in Mills,
Power. Politics. and People (New York: oxford, 1963), p. 235.
West quotes this passage on p. 138 of American Evasion.
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This sort of pragmatic politics would, to be sure,
address but half of West's aqenda. It would help rein-
viqorate "a sane, sober, and sophisticated intellectual life
in America," but it would not--at least directly or in the
short run--promise much by way of reqeneratinq "the social
forces empowerinq the disadvantaqed, deqraded, and dejected"
(239). But it is not to be sneezed at. If American intel-
lectuals could be tauqht to speak once aqain without embar-
rassment or apoloqy of a politics of truth, we miqht at least
beqin to recover the inteqrity of our own dialoqical com-
munity and put ourselves in a better position to contribute
somethinq to the reconstruction of the larqer society when
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